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‘Muslims’ after Partition and 9/11:  
The Construction of a ‘Religious Minority’ and its 




Upon entering the Institute for Asian and African Studies of the 
Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, one frequently stumbles upon posters 
and bulletins announcing talks or exhibitions, all of which ‘somehow’ 
seem to be related to ‘Asia’ and ‘Africa’. Sometimes, this has a rather 
painful sight to it: there you are, spending hours on the deconstruction 
of concepts and images, only to find them resurrected again in photo 
and print, depicted in essentialising ways. Sometimes, these posters 
may serve as a reminder that the debates of the classroom have 
neither roots nor limits there, but live outside the world of academia 
indeed, and vibrantly so.  
One day, some purple leaflets found their way into the library's 
locker room, proclaiming: “Muslims in Germany: Being normal is not 
enough.”1 Hoping to “creatively challenge popular clichés”, the 
Hamburg-based magazine Zenith had organised a photo contest in 
order to present “a realistic picture of the daily Muslim life in 
Germany”.2 The award ceremony took place in Berlin-Moabit on 28 
March 2014, free “oriental” snacks included. Having passed those 
leaflets, one might proceed into the department's library. On the 
bookshelf sits prominently a recent issue of India Today, its cover 
showing an illustration of a woman wearing a black hijab. The title 
reads: “Inside the Muslim Mind. Angst & Aspiration” – a 16-page-
feature with interviews, maps, statistics, and special reports roughly 
outlining the situation of the “Muslim minority” before the 2014 
elections. In his address to the readers, the editor-in-chief underlines 



























country is the possibility of sectarian violence. If 190 million are at 
odds with the state, the very idea of India will be under threat.”3 
The Zenith photo contest and India Today’s cover story serve as 
evidence of a discourse that brought forth the ‘Muslim minority’ and, 
for the latter, a concomitant representational burden. What mechan-
isms underlie the construction of this ‘group’, a religious minority 
within the ‘secular’ nation-state? Which events have shaped the 
discursive framing of this ‘minority’? What consequences entail its 
construction and specific discursive framing – both for the ‘minority’ 
and the ‘majority’? In order to find answers to these questions, I will 
draw on the productive powers that lie within the exercise of 
comparison: 
[T]o confront two conjunctures with one another, in order to alter 
our understanding of both; a confrontation, furthermore, which 
allows them neither to be assimilated into the narrative structure 
of a unilinear history, nor merely to become signs of their own 
unique particularity. (Mufti 1995: 78) 
By bridging continents and centuries, I seek to abstract from two 
unique particularities – the ‘Muslim minority’ in both India and Western 
Europe – the shared mechanisms and symbolisms of their con-
struction. My argument is that the impact of the Partition of British 
India in 1947 bears striking similarity to that of the attacks on the 
World Trade Center in September 2001: both events consolidated pre-
existing notions of ‘Muslims’ in India and Western Europe forcefully.4 
The scale of violence common to 9/11 and Partition contributed to an 
atmosphere of fear and loss that united ‘us’ against ‘them’: with the 
exterior enemy – ‘Islamic terrorists’ and ‘Pakistanis’ – being depicted 
as ‘Muslims’, heightened attention then was paid to ‘Muslims’ inside, 
who eventually became an interior other, a ‘minority’.  
The discursive repercussions of 9/11 and Partition saw to it that, 
first, ‘Muslims’ was employed as a descriptive to override all other 
markers of identity. Second, this label then demarcates ‘Muslims’ from 
the ‘true’ ‘national’ citizen of both India and Western Europe, with the 
former being constructed as ‘Hindu’, the latter as ‘Christian’. Third, 
along with that demarcation came and comes the constant demand of 
‘loyalty’ from the ‘minority’. Fourth, ‘Muslims’ constitute a religious 
‘minority’ – they are set apart from the nation's core because of 
‘religious’, and not, for example, ‘ethnic’ or ‘linguistic’ ‘differences’, 
though these qualities at times overlap. Hence, as they are being 



























discourses, ‘Muslims’ serve as the ‘other’ for an idealised projection of 
the ‘secular’ nation's self. Fifth, though in the position of the margin-
alised, the ‘Muslim minority’ nonetheless poses enormous challenges to 
that ‘majority’, precisely by defying the latter's claim of an irreligiously 
imagined ‘nation’ and ‘secular’ state. 
Indeed, these very concepts – that of the ‘nation’ and that of 
‘secularism’ – first provide the ground for the construction of a 
‘religious minority’. As every identity needs its contradiction in order to 
be, “minorities [...] are the means of constituting national majorities or 
mainstreams” (Pandey 1999: 608). Similarly, by demarcating that 
which is ‘worldly’ and ‘rational’, secularism “defines itself as the 
starting point in relation to which the ‘religious’ is constructed” (Hurd 
2004: 238, emphasis in original).  
I thus understand the ‘Muslim minority’ not as ontologically existent, 
but rather as a discursive product of “cognitive categorization” and a 
“framing [which] has to be defined and operationalized on the basis of 
[...] social constructivism” (Scheufele 1999: 103, 105). That discursive 
framing is undertaken by journalists, politicians, and other agents in 
public and political discourses, and hence cannot be separated from 
questions of power: who can speak, and who is heard? Both the 
discourses of post-Partition India and post-9/11 Western Europe 
produced new centres whilst locating the ‘Muslim minority’ at the 
margin, thereby creating “new antagonistic identity categories [which 
became] the common sense of the social structure” (Yilmaz 2012: 
369). This shift as inscribed in the social structure not only informs 
perceptions of the present and future, but is furthermore “project[ed] 
back into the past as if it has always constituted the social/political 
horizon” (ibid.: 369). In order to make the articulation of alternative 
identities and politics possible again, the discursive construction of the 
‘Muslim minority’ must first be contextualised and understood. 
Nation, History, Legitimacy 
On the surface, contextual differences appear to make a juxtaposition 
of the ‘Muslim minority’ in India with that of Western Europe unusual.5 
The latter does not constitute one but rather a conglomerate of nation-
states, all of which maintain their own governments, languages, 
narratives, etc. Then again, almost the same may be said of 
‘multicultural’ India with its diverse communities and “numerous 
existing religions, languages, lifestyles” (Bajpai 2012: 197). And here 



























precisely that sense of relative ‘unity’ over differences, the narratives 
of both India and Western Europe have used or now use ‘Islam’ as its 
‘other’. 
What has bound India into a ‘nation-state’, and how is that nation 
imagined? What has brought forth notions of Western Europe as a 
‘cultural’ unit, which in part now sees its political reflection in the 
European Union? In both contexts, these questions cannot be 
separated from that of the ‘Muslim minority’, for they cross-fertilise 
each other: “nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its 
adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, 
who thereby become outsiders” (Eriksen 1996: 30). These boundaries 
are drawn on multiple levels, both internally and externally. First, the 
‘nation’ lends legitimacy to the ‘state’, which will contest its territory 
against ‘other’ nations. That territory – or rather, the notions of ‘land’ 
and ‘belonging’ – in turn informs the nation's narrative, with the claim 
of ‘nativeness’ to land constituting its ‘legitimate’ possession thereof. 
From this powerful idea – that any people or individual can actually be 
‘native’ to a place on earth – stems the dichotomy of ‘being native’ vs. 
‘being foreign’, thus making possible the category of the ‘immigrant’ 
and ‘foreigner’.  
It is precisely through these discursive lenses that ‘Muslims’ have 
been viewed upon. Although the term ‘immigrant’ will not be employed 
for ‘Muslims’ in India, their discursive role nonetheless bears striking 
similarity to that of ‘Muslims’ in Western Europe. In both cases, they 
have been constructed as standing outside the imagined community; 
they are the ones that do not belong, neither to land nor nation. As the 
‘cultural similarity’ of the latter tends to be narrated with ‘historical’ 
references – shared ‘heritage’, shared ‘experiences’, shared ‘values’ – 
a brief look back not into history but historiography shall illuminate 
how (supra)national imaginations drew and draw upon ‘history’ for 
authority and legitimacy. In the teleological narratives of both 
‘Christian Europe’ and ‘Hindu India’, ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ came to 
figure as the ‘other’. 
1. Western Europe 
As frequently quoted in this context, the existence of Muslim com-
munities in Western Europe spans back to the seventh century, when 
Arab rule took over in Andalusia, Spain. And yet, fourteen centuries 
later, powerful public and political discourses still portray ‘Muslims’ as 



























European identity in contradistinction to Islam – “‘in many cases it was 
the defense of Christian identity against Islam that set the ground for 
the existence of so-called European culture’” (cit. in Hellyer 2009: 2). 
Narratives of Western Europe typically rely on two reference points: a 
shared Hellenic and Roman heritage; and ‘Christianity’, which informs 
a simultaneously ‘secular’ and yet decidedly ‘Christian’ culture. The 
latter often is tied with ‘civilisational’ values. In fact, Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing, former French President and chairman of the Convention of 
the Future of Europe from 2002-3, “stated that he was considering 
inserting 'an assertion of Christian values' into his draft constitution for 
the European Union” (Hurd 2004: 250). 
The ambiguity of this narrative of ‘Christian’ Europe – and how it 
indeed uses ‘Islam’ as its ‘other’ – may best be illustrated by the 
debate on Turkey’s accession to the EU. Since it acquired status as 
associate member of the European Community in 1963,6 discussions 
over Turkey's ‘forming a part of Europe’ have come up frequently ever 
since. The website DebatingEurope.eu, supported by, among others, 
the European Parliament, lists some of the most popular arguments for 
and against Turkey’s EU membership. Under the headline “History, 
Culture, Religion” is written: 
Reaching out to this prosperous Muslim democracy would send a 
clear signal that Europe is open to the Islamic world. […] Turkey 
has been fully entwined in Europe’s history since the Ottomans 
crossed the Bosporus in the 14th Century. […] Turkey’s rich 
cultural heritage is unique, but it is also undeniably European.7  
Right next to it, the counterargument reads:  
Turkey’s historic and cultural roots lay in Central Asia and the 
Middle East. It missed the shared experiences that bind 
Europeans together, from the cultural legacy of Renaissance and 
Enlightenment, to the horrors of the Second World War II which 
galvanized the drive for united Europe. As an overwhelmingly 
Muslim nation, Turkey’s cultural traditions are fundamentally 
different from that of Christian Europe […].8 
In both arguments, ‘Islam’ serves as a distinct point of reference and 
is demarcated as not (yet) belonging to Western Europe. However, 
“the southern territories of Spain and Portugal were indeed pre-
dominantly Muslim countries for longer than they have been Catholic”; 
and the first translations of classical Greek philosophers were owing to 
Arab Muslim scholars who had saved them from oblivion, thereby 



























Countless other examples may be drawn upon to write against a 
“narrative describing ‘Islam and Europe’ […] which is predisposed to an 
emphasis on conflict, or, as some put it, on ‘clash’” (ibid.: 2). My point, 
however, is not to engage in a similar debate but instead to dem-
onstrate that the teleological narratives of both India and Western 
Europe have provided the basis for the construction of a ‘Muslim 
minority’. 
2. India 
In the decades leading up to Partition, the (what-came-to-be) national 
narratives of India and Pakistan sought to construct a separate rather 
than shared Hindu and Muslim heritage. The use of two different 
scripts for ‘Hindi’ and ‘Urdu’, and the thereby subsequent growing 
apart of these two languages, is a highly symbolic example for that 
construction of ‘difference’ – and how the latter allegedly legitimises 
the respective nationalist claims. In their speeches and pamphlets, 
nationalist leaders constructed a linear history of ‘Hindu’ inheritance – 
already the name given to India during colonial rule, Bharatvarsha, 
provided ample opportunities to do so, as it frequently became linked 
with Bharat, the first Hindu king (Bajpai 2012: 195). In The Discovery 
of India (1946), Jawaharlal Nehru consciously invokes the ‘past’ – or 
what he makes of it – in order to ‘understand’ its impact on the 
‘present’. He provides his own historical account of a ‘Indian national 
culture’, which he first traces back to ‘classical’ Sanskritic society. As 
Mufti (1995: 88) points out, 
the chief characteristic of this [Indian] national cultural life is 
precisely that it has eventually forced all invaders from the 
Aryans to the Mughals – and it is interesting that the Aryan Vedas 
become the very source of national culture, while Turco-Persian 
‘Islam’ remains an interruption – to become ‘Indianized’ (DI, 62, 
241). The chief characteristic of Indian national culture therefore 
is its continuity, stretching back as it does to the 5,000-year-old 
Harappan (Indus Valley) civilization. 
Eriksen's (1996: 30) “cultural similarity” required for narrating the 
‘nation’ thus was found in a ‘Hindu’ informed history and heritage. 
Given the political context of the time – separate electorates having 
been introduced already with the Minto-Morley reforms in 1909, and 
the All India Muslim League's eventual claim for a distinct ‘Muslim 
nation’ – Nehru draws the boundaries of his imagined community as 



























“conquest and conversion”, whereby “the arrival of Islam can be 
experienced only as a trauma and, to be precise, as trauma to the 
nation” (Mufti 1995: 88).  
A similar presentation of ‘Islam’ can be found in an article published 
by Babu Sampurnanand on 30 July 1947. Then Education Minister in 
the Congress Government of Uttar Pradesh, he comments on the soon-
to-be Partition and Independence of India. Sampurnanand claims that 
India will recover its swa-raj (self-rule) not only from British co-
lonialists but from ‘Muslims’ rule: 
we are going to recover that [precious] thing that we lost a 
thousand years ago […] With the defeat of Prithviraj [at the hands 
of Mohammad Ghori] at the battle of Thanesar, Bharat [India] 
lost its swa [one's own, or self]. (ibid.: 616, additions and 
emphasis in original) 
The ‘Indian’ ‘we’ now meant ‘Hindu’, or ‘non-Muslim’ at the least. That 
equation of ‘Indian’ with ‘Hindu’, however, seeks to render the latter 
invisible. Indeed, the religiously informed components of these 
constructs – the ‘Indian’ nation, culture, history – may then only be 
challenged by ‘another’ religious group. This is illustrated by the 
following episode: 
[T]he Aj of Banaras, perhaps the most important Congress paper 
in the Hindi belt, welcomed the pledge of loyalty to the 
constitution taken by the Muslim League members of the 
Constituent Assembly, but asked on 20 August 1947 why the 
same people had absented themselves at the time of the singing 
of “Bande Mataram,” the “national song” (as Aj called it) 
composed by Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, with its fairly 
pronounced Hindu overtones. The Muslim legislators had 
explained that they had abstained on grounds of religious 
sensibility. The editors of the Banaras daily shot back that while 
this anthem, unlike the flag, had not so far been ratified by the 
Constituent Assembly, it nevertheless had the stamp of “historical 
legitimacy”. (Pandey 1999: 619) 
The ‘majority’ can simply decree the religious elements of its narrative 
to the realms of ‘culture’ and ‘history’, as “the presence or absence of 
religiosity among a political majority [is] irrelevant to its power” (Devji 
2007: 88). Yet that ‘culture’ and ‘history’ are contested, and that the 
story presented is only one of a many, might be forgotten when its 
agents and agenda are rendered invisible. Those challenging the 



























To the consequences that this situation entails for a religious minority 
within a ‘secular’ nation-state I will return later.  
The above-mentioned episode moreover illustrates how, after 
Partition, ‘Muslims’ were forever set apart from the ‘national’ core of 
India, and thus seen as essentially different from ‘Hindus’. This 
perception of ‘difference’ led to the retroactive construction of allegedly 
distinct ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ communities, which has an impact on 
scholarly attention till today : “[i]t seems [that] pluralism in South Asia 
has become synonymous only with the study of shared sites of Sufism 
and ‘folk Islam’” (Khan 2012: 392). It thus becomes important not 
only to recover “the shared and everyday connected civic life”, but, 
with regard to the question of this paper, to “re-locate the process 
through which the Muslim subject is produced through class, gender, 
literary and spatial politics” (ibid.: 392, 395). And yet ironically, while 
these different fields repeatedly reproduce the category of the 
‘Muslim’, their very own identity markers then become erased by the 
latter. Hence, the questions with regard to identity construction and 
politics of all kinds must be, first, who profits, and second, what other 
constituents of a person's identity and position in society are rendered 
invisible? 
Becoming 'Muslim': Identity, Loyalty, Threat 
1. India  
In his essay on the nineteenth century colonial stereotype of “The 
Bigoted Julaha” (1983), Gyanendra Pandey undertook precisely that 
task of critically examining the politics of constructing a ‘Muslim 
identity’. Pandey (1983: PE-22) states that 
the notion of a ‘unified’ and relatively undifferentiated Muslim 
community has tended to be over-stretched in the historical 
writings. Some shared feeling of belonging to a single religion 
there probably was, but it is doubtful that the mass of the 
Muslims in any particular region saw themselves as distinctly 
other than the ‘Hindus’; rather, they would appear to have 
conceived of themselves as divided from various Hindu (and 
indeed Muslim) castes much as Hindu castes were divided from 
another (emphasis in original). 
With new categories of identity being brought forth by public, political, 
colonial or other institutional discourses, the taking up of one or 
several of these markers necessarily is a process of ascription and/or 



























pellation: “‘being called a name’” first brings the subject into life, and 
that name then becomes the one and only way for the subject to ar-
ticulate – and thus constitute – itself (cit. in Spielhaus 2011: 137). 
Pandey illustrates this process in his case study of North Indian 
‘Muslim’ weavers in the late nineteenth century. In the 1891 census in 
Uttar Pradesh, Julahas had registered themselves in 244 different 
sections, deriving their ‘identity’ from geographical origin, caste, 
language, and other factors. Some “claimed a more or less noble 
Muslim descent” – a trend which was exacerbated by the 1901 census, 
when “officials decided to classify castes and communities according to 
rank” (Pandey 1983: PE-22). Hence, one of the many factors that 
contributed to the eventual stronger identification with the label 
‘Muslim’ was the possibility to thereby acquire upward mobility, which 
was awarded to those adhering to a ‘purer’ ‘Muslim’ identity. Similarly, 
for those Julahas of the lowest Hindu castes, conversion to Islam was a 
means to escape that status. Overall, as Pandey (1983: PE-22, PE-19) 
states carefully, “many Julahas were at this time taking only their first 
steps towards becoming ‘Muslims’”, with “the question of con-
sciousness” forever being impossible to answer. 
This at first only gradual process was accelerated to the extreme by 
the event of Partition. India, as demonstrated above, saw its 
construction as a ‘Hindu’ nation. All ‘others’ were left with a 
“hyphenated” identity: Indian Muslims, Indian Christians, Indian Jews, 
Anglo-Indians (Pandey 1999: 608). The burden that Partition placed 
upon ‘Indian Muslims’, however, was unlike that of other ‘minorities’. 
Informed by a Hindu majority, India's dominant discourses held 
‘Muslim’ ‘communalism’ and ‘separatism’ accountable for Partition. 
With Pakistan allegedly having been founded as the homeland for the 
Indian subcontinent's ‘Muslims’, ‘their’ nation-state now literally was 
on the ‘other’ side of independent India. On a nationwide level, then, 
Indian Muslims were turned into “the ‘minority’ even in districts, cities, 
or towns where they were a numerical majority”, for they were the 
ones that did not belong (ibid.: 610). ‘Not belonging’ consequently 
meant ‘belonging elsewhere’ – which in turn led to perceptions of 
threat and hence questions of loyalty.  
The regional, caste and occupational markers by which 
generations of Muslims had been known – and privileged, 
denigrated, or even declared to be only “half-Muslims” – seemed 
to lose much of their significance. The Muslims were now, more 



























conversation – simply “Muslims,” and all of them were suspect as 
open or closet Pakistanis. (Pandey 1999: 614-5) 
As the violent event of Partition had forcefully inscribed negative 
notions of ‘Muslims’, they now were constantly confronted with the 
“test of loyalty […] required only of those who are not ‘real’, ‘natural’ 
citizens” (ibid.: 611). In October 1947, the Socialist leader Dr. Ram 
Manohar Lohia “had pointedly asked India's Muslims to ‘surrender 
arms and … be loyal citizens of India, ready to fight, if need be, against 
Pakistan or any other country’” (cit. in ibid.: 617). In the same month, 
Govind Ballabh Pant, Congress Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, stated 
in a speech:  
Every Muslim in India would be required to shed his blood fighting 
the Pakistani hordes, and each one should search his heart now, 
and decide whether he should migrate to Pakistan or not. (cit. in 
ibid.) 
Nearly seventy years after Partition, the issue of India Today as 
mentioned in the introduction is but one example that points to the 
continued “situation of suspicion and fear”, which was since intensified 
by the Kashmir insurgencies of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Babri 
Masjid burning in 1992, 9/11, and the Gujarat killings in 2002. As “the 
Muslim community [...] is suspected of being anti-national [...]” 
(Pradhan & Deka 2014: 12) on the whole, the stigmatisation is felt by 
individuals on a day to day basis:  
I feel like a second-class citizen in my own country. I see the 
looks I get from others when I step on a train. I can sense their 
wariness. Am I to be treated differently just because I sport a 
beard?' asks Sariful Islam, a 53-year-old businessman from 
Kapashdanga village. (Banerjee 2014: 21) 
In recent research amongst women wearing hijab in India, the latter 
often “felt that Muslim women had been stereotyped as backward, 
illiterate, oppressed and victims of a barbaric society and/or closely 
aligned to terrorists in some way” (Wagner et al. 2012: 533-4). Thus, 
in addition to being held responsible for communal violence and seen 
as potential terrorists, ‘Muslims’ experience stigmatisation because 
‘their’ religion has been framed as ‘backward’ and ‘pre-modern’. That 
framing places an incredible burden particularly on ‘Muslims’ forming a 
‘religious minority’ in an allegedly ‘secular’ context.  Before I return to 
the consequences of their position within that society, however, I will 
now illustrate the similarity in both the mechanisms and symbolisms of 



























2. Western Europe 
As cited above, Pandey (1999) demonstrates how Indian Muslims 
came to be ‘Muslims’ only, losing other markers of identity. That usage 
of one descriptive to override all others finds its counterpart in post-
9/11 Western Europe. In 1994, media had referred to Cem Özdemir as 
the first German Bundestag-member of ‘Turkish descent’. Sixteen 
years later, when Aygül Özkan was appointed Social Minister of Lower-
Saxony in 2010, times had changed, and so had the headlines. As Bild-
Online would have it: “‘So help me God. Germany's first Muslim 
Minister sworn into office in Lower-Saxony's State Parliament’”9 (cit. in 
Spielhaus 2011: 133).  
The ‘nation’ seeps through either depiction, as both seek to highlight 
the ‘difference’ of the ‘hyphenated’ citizen. Yet what precisely 
constitutes that ‘difference’ has changed: from ‘Turkish’ to ‘Muslim’. 
That change in descriptive took place in all Western European 
countries, albeit the markers that were formerly used to denominate 
today's ‘Muslims’ varied from country to country: 
Until recently, it was far more common to identify them by their 
immigration or citizenship status (immigrants, asylum-
seekers/refugees, or foreigners), by their economic function 
(guestworkers), or by their race, ethnicity or nationality (Black, 
Arab, South Asian, Turk, etc.). This was partly a result of state 
rules that automatically categorised people by an established 
institutional logic, and partly a result of the modes of organisation 
of the migrants themselves. (Bleich 2009: 363-4) 
The recent “salience of ‘Muslim’ as a politicised identity category” 
(Adamson 2011: 901, emphasis in original) points to the construction 
of an ‘other’ on the supranational level. With ‘them’ being contrasted 
against a new sense of ‘us’, the emergence of a ‘Muslim minority’ 
simultaneously reinforces a ‘European’ identity. In fact, Germany's 
most recent anti-immigrant movement now deliberately calls itself 
Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA). 
Misusing the 1989 East German slogan of “We are the People”, the 
adherents state their rejection of ‘Islam’ as part of the ‘Judeo-Christian 
occident’. Their outrage against ‘immigrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’ 
moreover shows how these two categories have become increasingly 
conflated with ‘Muslim’. From the 1960s onwards, migrant workers in 
Germany had come from, amongst other countries, Greece, Italy, 
Spain, and Turkey. While (erstwhile) citizens of the former three 



























latter are set apart due to them being ‘Muslims’. That shift in 
perception and thus denomination of ‘Muslims’ can be traced back to 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, when various events – framed as 
related to ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ – had already made or were making 
international headlines: the oil crisis, the Iranian revolution, the 
Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Rushdie affair, the Gulf War, the 
Palestinian intifada, the war in Bosnia (Said 1997; Bleich 2009; 
Adamson 2011; Yilmaz 2012). To use Said’s words (1997: 7): “It was 
enough to use the word ‘Islam’ to cover what ‘we’ were worried about 
on a world scale”. 
Then came the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 
2001. What Partition did for India, 9/11 did for Western Europe: it 
fostered the “tendency to analyse any expression of Islam from a 
political perspective” because it was perceived “as an internal and 
external threat” (Cesari 2005: 40). Incidents such as the Madrid train 
bombings and the murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh in 
2004, the bombings in London of July 2005, and the Danish Jyllands-
Posten cartoon controversy in 2006 further consolidated that 
perception of ‘threat’. Due to the heightened sensibility to and 
suspicion of ‘Muslims’, the latter term now was applied frequently, and 
often in error. Its usage by media and politicians resulted in lending it 
an almost ‘ethnic’ quality, for it had come to be employed irrespective 
of whether the thereby described persons were believing in or 
‘practising’ Islam. As Spielhaus (2011: 131) points out, the prevailing 
definition in discourse essentially deduces a person's ‘Muslimness’ from 
his/her ‘ethnic’ background, but then continues to employ it as a 
religious attribution regardless. In turn, the stigmatization of that 
attribution is tantamount “to a form of religious discrimination more or 
less identical to the categories of ethnicity” – what Cesari (2005: 49) 
denominates as “the racialization of Islam.” This process finds itself 
literally mirrored in the 2003 decision of the Commission for Racial 
Equality in the UK to bring “the issue of Muslims (a non-racial 
community) to the centre of its work” (Hellyer 2009: 162). 
Just as in India, then, ‘Muslims’ have been cast as a homogeneous 
collective that is essentially ‘different’ from the ‘European’. The 
merging of those two identities into a ‘hyphenated’ one – for the ‘true’ 
European is ‘Christian’ – is accompanied by notions of threat, as the 
general suspicion goes that ‘not belonging here’ means ‘belonging 
elsewhere’. Precisely from this perception of ‘threat’ then evolves the 



























terms themselves – are frequently taken up by Western European 
media and politicians. 
In an article titled “Muslims are trying to prove their loyalty” (The 
Telegraph 2008), one of the examples given to illustrate the ‘loyalty’ of 
British Muslims to the ‘nation’ is that “nearly every Muslim organisation 
regularly enjoins young men to join the Armed Forces”.10 With 
reference to recent research of the University of Essex, The Guardian 
(2012) states that there is “a tendency by non-Muslims to assume that 
Muslims struggle with their British identity and divided loyalties”.11 The 
theme of “British Muslim Identity and Loyalty” is also referred to by 
the Islamic Society of Britain, which states on its website: “Can you be 
British and Muslim? The answer is a resounding ‘YES’”.12 It then goes 
on to say that 
[l]oyalty to the state is also an important aspect of this 
discussion. […] Some Muslim scholars have gone as far as saying 
that when a point of tension exists between British interests and 
the interests of a Muslim nation abroad, then British Citizens who 
are Muslims should support Britain by virtue of the social contract 
of citizenship they have entered into. (ibid.) 
General suspicion of ‘Muslims’ and their ‘loyalty’ likewise was, and still 
is, on the rise in Germany. In 2004, Otto Schily, then Minister of the 
Interior, addressed Muslims living in Germany to organise candle-lit 
demonstrations against terrorist attacks and for a peaceful inter-
pretation of Islam. Federal President Horst Köhler asked for Muslims to 
raise their voice in unison; Wolfgang Schäuble, back then member of 
the parliamentary opposition, wanted Muslims to distance themselves 
from terrorism (Spielhaus 2011: 141).  
That ‘Muslims’ pose a ‘threat’ to ‘Europe’ as a whole is overtly 
claimed in the following article, which was published in the Irish Herald 
(2014): 
Ireland is far from being alone in having to deal with this dilemma 
of misplaced loyalties in the Muslim community. The UK, France 
and many other European countries have much larger numbers of 
native-born Muslims willing to go and fight in what they feel is 
indeed a noble cause. […] In Ireland, however, the smaller 
number means we are in a better position to combat this threat.13  
In order to prevent “Muslim youth” from “radicalisation”, the author 
demands the creation of “an identity that maintains the Islamic 
tradition but meshes with the values and mores of modern Irish 



























In Spain, ‘Muslim’ seems to signify an extra-national identity as 
well. In an article titled “The fear of saying you're a Muslim” (ElMundo 
2012), one of the interviewed women states: “the most common 
phrase we are told is ‘get out of this country’ […] most people just 
don't get it in their head that I'm not a foreigner, I'm Spanish, from 
the Basque region”.14 In a short text titled “Defence and Loyalty 
demonstrated to Spain”, the Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de 
España (UCIDE) refers to a highly decorated subdivision in the Spanish 
Army that has traditionally incorporated Muslims, and then “repudiates 
any hint of suspicion against Muslim Spanish militia and their 
loyalty”.15 The organisation also states its concern over reports of 
Muslims having lost their job due to religious prejudice and dis-
crimination. The multiple stereotypes ‘Muslims’ are being confronted 
with not only stem from notions of ‘threat’ and ‘misplaced identities’, 
but moreover derive from the long-standing misrepresentation of 
‘their’ religion. Rather than reproducing the latter here or examining its 
origins, I instead now will illustrate the role a ‘religious’ – and 
specifically, ‘Muslim’ – minority plays in a ‘secular’ nation-state.  
The ‘Religious Minority’ in a ‘Secular’ Nation-State 
Due to the negative misrepresentations of ‘Islam’, and the construction 
of ‘Muslims’ as a religious minority in an allegedly ‘secular’ context, 
the representational burden that falls upon the figure of the 
Muslim is precisely that of being the other within the modern 
nation, the continually repeated, negative reminder of the 
national(ist) self's modernity [...] [It] becomes an undifferentiated 
staging ground for the traditional, the premodern, the under-
developed, the archaic. (Mufti 1995: 84, 85) 
That staging serves various purposes. Again, it may be invoked to 
create a new sense of ‘we’. Differences within the newly perceived 
‘majority’ are glossed over, unity may be achieved amongst those who 
once were disunited.  
1. Western Europe 
In Western Europe, the shift in discourse that constructed ‘Muslims’ as 
its supranational – and ‘backward’ – ‘other’ saw to it that 
the pronoun ‘we’ is used to mean first ‘we’ the progressives, and 
then a slide occurs towards ‘we’ the nation (or in a broader sense, 



























‘we’ indicate new ways of articulating ‘we’-ness – a slippage 
through which traditionally progressive notions are rearticulated 
as the core of national culture(s) […] traditionally progressive 
anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-sexist and anti-homophobic 
arguments are detached from their historical relations to left-wing 
politics and reappropriated by the populist right to mark national 
identity, particularly in European nations. (Yilmaz 2012: 373-4) 
The ‘Western’ self becomes equated with gender equality; sexual, 
political, and religious freedom; and other ‘modern’ and ‘civilisational’ 
tropes that ‘Muslims’ ostensibly lack. Formerly marginalised positions 
can thereby move towards the centre: The representation of ‘Muslim’ 
women as suppressed allows non-Muslim feminists to relocate 
‘patriarchy’, and, by uniting with those they had formerly fought 
against, enter mainstream politics (Haritaworn, Tauqir & Erdem 2007: 
194). In a similar fashion, non-Muslim queers that portray Muslims as 
the “real homophobes” thus not only push aside the brutal history of 
European homophobia and its perpetuated violence, but moreover 
empower their formerly victimized identity (ibid.: 201). On the level of 
state politics, Jasbir Puar uses the conceptual frame of “homo-
nationalism” to criticise “narratives of progress and modernity that 
continue to accord some populations access to citizenship – cultural 
and legal – at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other 
populations” (2013 : 337). She identifies “Islamophobia” as one of the 
factors that have contributed to the production of narratives alike. 
Notions of the ‘backwardness’ of ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ derive from 
their constructed oppositeness to Christianity and secularism, and their 
thus alleged incompatibility with modernity. In Western Europe, the 
Protest Reformation provided the ground for 
[t]he Westphalian settlement [which] cemented a modern 
concept of social and political order in which individual subjects 
assembled a society under a single sovereign authority. […] This 
new moral order, however, was still conceived within a broader 
Christian framework. […] Thus a specific concept of secularism 
was inaugurated at Westphalia and contributed to the normative 
basis for the contemporary state system. (Hurd 2004: 241) 
Then came Enlightenment's philosophical criticism, seeking to both 
inherit and legitimise the state's authority by pure ‘reason’ and thus 
necessarily calling for a ‘secular’ state and ‘rational’ citizens. Kant's 
influential moral philosophy called for the privatisation of religion. The 
separation of the latter from all matters public is the desire of laicists. 



























tically, re-inscribe the boundary between the public and the private, 
between the sacred and the secular, between the mundane and the 
metaphysical” (ibid.: 243). Hence, laicism produces the religious 
subject itself whilst simultaneously relocating it at the realm of the 
violent and irrational. This renders its very ideal impossible.  
In any case, most Western European nation-states instead have 
found different and extremely ambiguous ways “to maintain the 
historical accommodation of religion” and for “allow[ing] religion its 
proper place in political life” (Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero 
2006: 18). Notions of the ‘violent’ and ‘irrational’ were projected upon 
the other religion. Thus was made possible the very concept of “Judeo-
Christian secularism”, which, by its adherents, is not seen as a 
contradiction in terms but as “a unique Western achievement rooted in 
a shared civilizational heritage (Hurd 2004: 246-7). ‘Civilization’ 
indeed is a key term here, for Judeo-Christian secularists believe that 
their ‘religious’ heritage provides the foundation for ‘Western’ 
‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ in the first place. As these ideas become 
inextricably linked, “it follows that those who are not secular are not 
Western, and those who are not Western cannot be secular” (ibid.: 
251). 
As Mufti points out, this poses an allegedly irresolvable dilemma for 
the religious minority within that context: “how to remain [or be] 
‘secular’ and distinctly Muslim” (1995: 84). In Denmark, where dis-
cussions had evolved over the right of employees to wear hijab in 
private shops and firms, ‘debates’ were “typically framed as a Kultur-
kampf against ‘spiritual darkness’ and religiously motivated 
discrimination and dominance of women” (Mouritsen 2006: 86). The 
reply of Muslim women was to the point: wearing hijab “is an 
individual choice, which takes on an even more ‘autonomous’ meaning 
in a secular society” (ibid.). By repudiating its constructed con-
tradiction, this response successfully turns the dilemma as presented 
by Mufti upside down. Moreover, the visible resistance of these women 
to public oppression challenges notions of ‘secularism’ in Western 
Europe. What precisely constitutes an allegedly ‘secular’ society? 
Simple as the definition of secularism may seem – “a distinction be-
tween the public realm of citizens and policies and the private realm of 
belief and worship” (Modood & Kastoryano 2006: 163) – it likewise 
renders the ideal of a secular state impossible, for the private en-
counters the public on a daily basis. The question to be asked is: on 



























It is precisely there that lays the power and burden of the Muslim 
minority, as 
[t]heir challenges expose the taken-for-grantedness of secularism 
in most European countries. They press politicians and 
intellectuals to rethink what is secularism, whether it has ever 
truly characterized modern European societies and most 
importantly why and in what version it is still desirable. 
(Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero 2006: 3) 
Numerous examples for those encounters come to mind here: 
Switzerland's ban of building Mosque minarets due to a popular 
initiative in 2009; the debate on circumcision in Germany in 2013; or, 
more generally speaking, debates over religious holidays, prayer 
breaks during work hours, state-funded ‘religious’ education, 
cemeteries, and so forth. Moreover, with ‘the veil’ as worn by some 
Muslim women having become a highly contested symbol for the 
‘oppression’ and ‘backwardness’ of the latter, many Western European 
countries have seen a ‘national’ debate over the ‘meaning’ of ‘the 
veil’.16 It is noteworthy that many of the ‘problematic’ encounters 
evolve around visibility (hijab and the building of mosques/minarets) 
and education (‘allowing’ students and/or teachers to wear hijab), with 
the latter being responsible for the transmittal of the nation's core 
‘values’ and ideas. The ‘other’ and its ‘cultural threat’ shall not be 
exposed to ‘us’, and especially not to ‘our’ children. Because ‘they’ are 
visible, however, and indeed can speak, ‘Muslims’ challenge notions of 
‘secularism’ and ‘equal rights’. Hence, Western European countries are 
pressed to rethink their conceptualisation of ‘secularism’ and con-
sequently alter their laws according to that re-evaluation. 
In Spain, debate over ‘the veil’ first evolved in “2002 when a 
Moroccan girl in a Madrid school insisted on wearing a headscarf in 
class” (Martín-Muñoz & López-Sala 2005: 132). When a Catholic school 
which was partly state-funded expelled another Moroccan girl for 
wearing hijab, education authorities required another state-run school 
to take in the student, but did not force the partly state-funded 
Catholic school to readmit the girl (ibid.). In Brussels in 2003, the city 
decided not to admit students wearing the hijab to its municipal 
schools. In overall Belgium, it was then ruled that each school may 
decide on its own whether or not to ‘allow’ its students to wear the veil 
(Bousetta & Jacobs 2006: 30-1). 
In 2003, a Muslim Italian, “asked the teachers in the pre-school his 



























classroom or to also exhibit sura 112 from the Qur'an” (Saint-Blancat 
& Perocco 2005: 101). After the school's headmaster refused to do so, 
Smith took the case to the local court of L'Alquila, Italy, where 
judgement was passed in his favour. This was followed by “[a] bitter 
national debate [...] regarding the relations between the lay state, the 
church and religious freedom” (ibid.: 102). A similar debate on “Italian 
culture and identity and their compatibility with religious and cultural 
diversity” had already taken place in 2000, when the Mayor of Lodi, a 
small city near Milan, had given a municipal piece of land to a local 
Islamic organisation so that it could build a mosque there 
(Triandafyllidou 2006: 123).  
In 2004, the Federal Court of Germany relegated the decision of 
whether teachers were ‘legally allowed’ to wear hijab in public schools 
to state legislations – on the grounds that this was to be judged by 
educational boards, and thus a matter not of federal but state 
(Bundesländer) politics. Hence, in 2004, Baden-Württemberg became 
the first German state which forbade its teachers to wear hijab. 
Numerous German states then followed suit. The state of Berlin 
prohibited the wearing of any religious symbols not only in schools but 
by all civil servants (Cesari 2005: 47). 
In France, a similar law was passed in 2004, banning all religious 
symbols in public schools. After heated national debate over ‘the veil’, 
President Chirac set up a commission to inquire into the role of 
secularism in France. In its report titled “Affirming a Firm Secularism 
that Brings People Together”, the ‘experts’ proposed to ban the veil, 
arguing that “the question is no longer of freedom of conscience, 
but of public order”, citing “tensions and confrontations” in 
schools, and “pressures” and “constraints” on young women to 
wear the veil. (cit. in Bleich 2009: 373) 
Interestingly, the arguments brought forth in favour of ‘secularism’ 
wander through continents and centuries in a strikingly similar robe: 
‘secularism’ is invoked often as a necessity for ‘unity’ and ‘peace’. 
Immanuel Kant already, to whose moral philosophy is indebted much 
of secular and laicist theory, hoped for Christian theology to be 
replaced with ‘rational religion’ in order “to overcome the adversarial 






























Precisely within that discursive frame – overcoming ‘sectarianism’, or 
rather: ‘communalism’ – took place the debate on an ‘Indian’ con-
ception of ‘secularism’ after Partition: “secularism was viewed as the 
surviving dictum that would unify all existing communities under one 
umbrella, at least ideologically” (Bajpai 2012: 197). In the decades 
leading up to independence, the establishment of the All India Muslim 
League with its later demand for a distinct ‘Muslim’ nation-state 
provided the ground for  
the construction of a dichotomous narrativisation [...] whereby all 
associated with the Muslim League implied a politics of 
communalism whereas that associated with the Congress was 
secular nationalism. (ibid.: 195) 
After Partition, that prejudiced image was conferred to all notions of 
‘Muslim’ politics. ‘Secularism’ came to be equated with the very idea of 
an ‘Indian’ (Hindu) nation, the term itself being employed “as a 
replacement for nationalism”, with its “co-ordinates [… being] defined 
vis-à-vis its prominent other, ‘Communalism’” (ibid.: 199, 198). The 
conceptual frame of ‘Indian’ secularism was thus only possible in 
contradistinction to its allegedly ‘non-secular’ ‘Muslim’ other. 
During the struggle for independence, the Congress Party had 
exploited ‘religion’ in most ambiguous ways. On the one hand, its 
Hindu majority leadership employed religious symbolism to mobilise 
the masses, and to gain “cultural confidence vis-à-vis the colonial 
power” (ibid.: 194). On the other hand, given the country's religious 
diversity, for the movement to be a truly national one, it had to be 
‘secular’ – how else could Congress have claimed to represent ‘all’ of 
India? In order to unite the ‘nation’ against a colonial power, its 
religious diversity had to be both recognised and incorporated. 
Ambiguously, the Congress leadership's commitment to ‘secularism’ 
then was “defended as a continuation of the ancient traditions of the 
country [… drawing] upon popular notions of Hindu civilizational 
virtues of tolerance and accommodation of religions and of minority 
groups” (Bajpai 2002: 193). The similarity of the ‘civilisational claims’ 
of Hindu-informed ‘secularists’ to those of Judeo-Christian secularists is 
noteworthy.  
After independence, the implications of that religious diversity for 
the conceptualisation of the Indian nation-state were much discussed 
in the Constituent Assembly debates (1946-1949). K. M. Munshi, a 



























secular state, our mode of thought and life is largely coloured by a 
religious attitude to life... the state in India cannot be secular in the 
sense of being anti-religious’” (cit. in ibid.: 181). From that ambiguity 
– recognising the importance of religion whilst wanting to avoid the 
colonialists' mistake of mixing it with politics – stems a conception of 
‘secularism’ that 
would shift its location on a wide spectrum of claims – that 
religion was a defining factor of the Indian way of life, that Indian 
secularism did not imply irreligiousness, that religion had 
nonetheless to be relegated to the ‘private’ realm and expelled 
from the realm of politics, that the state would grant equal 
freedom to one and all to practice, preach and profess their own 
belief systems but that this would not intermingle with the 
domains of the state, and paradoxically enough, that the state 
would have to intervene in the religious domain to protect 
minorities. (Bajpai 2012: 199) 
That protection of the rights of religious minorities remains a highly 
contested field till today. Apart from the right to preserve their own 
languages, scripts and cultures, religious minorities can, for example, 
acquire partial state-funding for the establishment of institutions that 
impart religious education. Most importantly, private affairs – for 
instance, matters of inheritance and matrimony – may be managed 
according to the rules and doctrines of the respective minority 
communities. For the majority religion Hinduism, however, the state 
has in fact become an intervening force from the beginning. Article 17 
of the Constitution asks for the abolishment of the caste system in 
Hinduism, while Article 25 (2) enables the state “to make laws 
providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of the 
Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and 
sections of Hindus” (ibid.: 207).  
As the state increasingly undertook tasks of religious reform in 
Hinduism, notions of ‘secularism’ changed. By the 1980s, it came to be 
identified mostly with the protection of ‘religious minorities’ and their 
personal laws. A major difficulty was and is, however, that these 
‘religious’ laws at times stand in conflict with Fundamental Rights as 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, the desirability of a Uniform 
Civil Code (UCC) has been debated over from the early days of the 
freedom movement, with Nehru himself being in favour of a UCC. 
Moreover, the Directive Principles of Article 44 of the Constitution 



























The Shah Bano case famously constitutes a major hallmark within 
that debate on a UCC. In 1978, Shah Bano, a Muslim woman from 
Madhya Pradesh, had filed a claim for maintenance from her divorced 
husband. A small amount was first granted to her by the Indore 
Magistrate's Court, and then increased by the Madhya Pradesh High 
Court. Her husband argued that this conflicted with Muslim Personal 
Law, under which he was required to pay maintenance only for a 
certain period. The case was taken to the Supreme Court in 1985, 
which ruled that Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directing 
him to pay maintenance, applied regardless of religious personal law. 
In a highly controversial move, however, the court supported its 
judgment by claiming that Shah Bano was entitled to maintenance 
payments not only under the Criminal Procedure Code but under sharia 
as well (Bajpai 2002: 186). In fact, the Supreme Court had invited 
‘Muslim representatives’ to interpret Islamic doctrines on the grounds 
that it could not ignore the ‘sentiments’ of a large group of the 
population. Leaving aside the problem of representability, the ‘secular’ 
court had, by doing so, relegated the judgement of “what religion 
consisted in” to “the views of the members of a religious community, 
rather than those of the state or of non-members” (ibid.: 191). Even 
more ambiguously yet, the Supreme Court ultimately demanded the 
creation of a UCC that would replace religious personal law.  
This was met with protest by the 1973 founded All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), arguing “that a secular court could not 
decide on matters related to sharia and especially on matters related 
to the home and family” (Kirmani 2011: 5). In turn, the Hindu Right – 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – then “cit[ed] the opposition to the Shah 
Bano case as evidence of Muslim ‘backwardness’ and resistance to 
national integration” (ibid.: 6). Two themes thus reoccur in that 
rhetoric: ‘Muslims’ are portrayed as harbouring ‘sectarian’ sentiments; 
and the ‘oppressed Muslim woman’ must rescued by the ‘civilising 
mission’ of right-wing Hindu groups, whose rhetoric mirrors the 
colonial stance. Moreover, the Hindu Right argued 
that the apparently secular Congress has provided reservations 
for Muslims in civil and educational institutions and been lenient 
to discriminatory Muslim personal laws, thereby elucidating its 
prejudices. A state which is “genuinely” secular ought to view all 
citizens through a similar lens and thus a Uniform Civil Code is 
desirable. It is on the same stand that the Congress is labelled as 



























This is remarkable indeed, for it was the Hindu Right who had once 
been “in favour of Hindu theocratic institutions, scriptural injunctions, 
participation of religious institutions in legislative procedures [...]” and 
other clearly non-secular measures (ibid.: 210). During the 1950s, it 
had resented the codification and reform of Hindu personal law 
through the four Hindu code bills, instead desiring a non-
interventionary state.  
The controversy over the Shah Bano case reveals how both 
“supporters of the Hindu Right and Muslim conservative groups used 
‘Muslim women’ and personal law as the terrain on which to fight 
political battles over questions of group identity” (Kirmani 2011: 6). 
Moreover, it becomes evident that the ‘Muslim minority’ plays a major 
role in debates over ‘secularism’ in India – and indeed has done so 
from the very beginning of the state's formation, when the legacy of 
Partition informed the conceptualisation of ‘secular’ India. 
Conclusion 
2014 saw the election of Narendra Modi from the Hindu nationalist BJP 
as India's prime minister as well as an enormous rise of seats allocated 
to right-wing parties in the European Parliament. The irony of 
nationalist parties working together clearly is not only based on their 
common demand for more national autonomy from the European 
Union, but also well-founded in the anti-Islam agitation of prominent 
figures such as Marine le Pen (Front National) and Geert Wilders (Partij 
voor de Vrijheid). But one must refrain from merely pointing to the 
actions and rhetoric of right-wing powers. The discursive construction 
and abuse of the ‘Muslim minority’ is rather to be located at the very 
centres of society: media, courts, schools, governments.  
As illustrated in this essay, the excessive usage of the label ‘Muslim’ 
after Partition and 9/11 produced a ‘subject’ and ‘minority’ whose 
defining characteristic became ‘being Muslim’. That ‘quality’ is put at 
odds with the ‘true’ Western European and Indian, which in turn leads 
to demands of ‘loyalty’. At the same time, this demarcation of a 
‘distinct’ and ‘different’ group serves as the projection of an ‘other’ for 
an ideally imagined ‘Hindu’ India and ‘Christian’ Western Europe. The 
staging of the ‘Muslim’ minority as ‘backward’ and ‘pre-modern’ allows 
the respective Hindu and Christian majority to make ‘civilisational’ 
claims which are somehow tied to ‘their’ ‘religion’: the latter becomes 



























that provides the ground for the claim to an irreligiously imagined 
‘nation’ and a ‘secular’ state.  
This claim is disputed by ‘Muslims’ in India and Western Europe, 
who – as a religious minority – “inevitably threaten the authority of 
existing assumptions” by introducing new discourses and thereby 
disrupting others (Asad 1999: 181). Nonetheless, these challenges to 
the majority come from the position of the marginalised. The 
discursive construction of a ‘minority’ in contrast to a ‘majority’ can 
only but place a burden on the former. Moreover, its construction 
ultimately alters the very order of society itself. It presents 
a tectonic movement that has shaken the entire political 
landscape and realigned social and political movements along a 
new fault line. […] Once the new antagonistic identity categories 
become the common sense of the social structure, even those 
who argue against right-wing positions draw upon the same 
epistemology of the social. In this sense, an epistemic collusion 
occurs between right and left. It is this shared epistemology of 
the social that is the basis for the new hegemony. (Yilmaz 2012: 
369) 
The question that thus remains is how to break through this hegemony 
and its antagonistic identity categories, in short: how to make stories, 
identities, and politics possible again that do not even require the label 
“alternative” anymore. Riem Spielhaus' remarks at a talk in Berlin in 
June 2014 stayed with me: “This is a weird thing for me to say as a 
scholar of Islam”, she concluded, “but: we need to talk less about 
Islam.” Indeed it seems only then that other conceptions of the social 
may prevail again. 
                                                          
Endnotes 
1
 My translation. Cf.: “Muslime in Deutschland. Normal ist nicht genug.” (original leaflet). 
2
 My translation. Cf.: “für ein realistisches Alltagsbild des muslimischen Lebens in Deutschland” 
and “gängige Klischees kreativ zu hinterfragen”. Zenith-Fotopreis 2013, 
http://www.zenithonline.de/deutsch/zenith-fotopreis [retrieved 26.03.2014]. 
3
 Purie, Aroon. 2014. from the-editor-in-chief. International issue of India Today, 17 March, p. 1. 
4
 Although the attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 took place on US-American 
ground, I will instead focus on the discourses of Western Europe for various reasons. Said (1997: 
12) already pointed out the “extremely important distinction to be made between American and 
European awareness of Islam”. That difference in awareness stems from the colonial histories of 
some Western European countries and hence, large migrant populations from these (former) 



























                                                                                                                                                               
presentation; and overall a “long-standing cultural attention to Islam” and its perception as a 
“religiocultural challenge” (ibid.: 13). 
5
 By 'Western Europe' I refer to both a not clearly defined geographical entity and a 'cultural' 
imagination which unfortunately still operates along the borders of the Cold War. I thereby mean 
the nation-states of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (which geographically 'belongs' to Asia), Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  and Switzerland. Most of the mentioned are 
member-states of the European Union. All of these countries are inhabited by a 'Christian' 
majority population. 
6
 Republic of Turkey. Ministry for EU Affairs. ANKARA Agreement. 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=117&l=2 [retrieved 26.03.14]. 
7
 Debating Europe. Arguments for and against Turkey's EU membership. 
http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-against-turkeys-eu-




 My translation. Cf.: “So wahr mir Gott helfe. Deutschlands erste muslimische Ministerin im 
Landtag von Niedersachsen verteidigt” (cit. in Spielhaus 2011: 133). It is noteworthy that Aygül 
Özkan was a party member of, and thus appointed by, the CDU (Christian Democratic Union). 
10
 Hannan, Daniel. 2008. Muslims are trying to prove their loyalty. The Telegraph, 27 February, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/danielhannan/3555475/Muslims-are-trying-
to-prove-their-loyalty.html [retrieved 22.08. 14]. 
11
 Moosavi, Leon. 2012. Muslims are well-integrated in Britain – but no one seems to believe it. 
The Guardian, July 3, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/jul/03/muslims-
integrated-britain [retrieved 22.08.14]. 
12
 Islamic Society of Britain. British Muslim Identity and Loyalty. http://www.isb.org.uk/loyalty/ 
[retrieved 22.08. 14]. 
13




 My translation. Cf.: “La frase más común que nos dicen es 'vete a tu país' [...] a muchos no les 
entra en la cabeza que no soy extranjera, que soy española, vasca”.  
Figueras, Amanda. 2012. La angustia de decir que eres musulmán. El Mundo, 29 April, 
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/04/27/espana/1335521507.html [retrieved 22.08. 14]. 
15
 My translation. Cf.: “Los Grupos de Regulares han tenido componentes musulmanes 
tradicionalmente, y constituyen precisamente la unidad más condecorada del Ejército de España, 
por lo que desde la Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España rechazamos cualquier atisbo de 
sospecha sobre los militares musulmanes españoles y su lealtad [...]”. Unión de Comunidades 
Islámicas de España (UCIDE). Defensa y lealtad demostrada a España. 
http://www.ucide.org/es/content/defensa-y-lealtad-demostrada-espa%C3%B1     
[retrieved 22.08. 14]. 
16
 As Popal (2007: 92) points out, the terms 'discussion' and 'debate' are misleading indeed. The 
'other' women cannot bring in her voice due to it being permanently – and, as it seems, 
purposely – 'overheard'. The fact that it is being overheard means that she does speak but is not 
admitted into the discourse. Popal hence denominates the 'controversy' on the hijab as a 
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